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THE MARCH OF WAR
THE BATTLE OF THE SEVEN SEAS
Si"cr, tlie publication oj our detailed article "The Battle oj T07l6" in our iuue
oj A U/lUlIt/September 1942. we have brought regular reportJl on I!Ifl OOUrJlIl oj thi4 boUl.
u:llmding OtJer all the sws oj the world; and tile hm'" al'ways attempted to unearth
th" actual juclJl jrQ11l the mass of contradictory and largely t~iOlU ite",. oj newJl.
• ince our last review i11 June 1943. thiJI battle hue entered upon a 'leW phuefl. which
is a7lOlyzed in the jollowing pagu.
U nWlJl othllrwisfl stated, all to,magejigureJl rflpru,,", grou registered kmiI.-K.M.
FOR many montlls now the whole worldha-a been wonderi.ng about the V·boat
war. Since April 1943, V·boat activity
haa taken a sudden downward turn a.a
compared with previous result-s. Have the
Allies really found an answer to the German
V.boat, to Admiral Donitz'& tactics and
strategy? The reply to this question, given
by both camps, is that the Allies have
developed new technical met,hods of defense
which have caused the German Admiralty
to recall a large part of their submarine fleet
until effective countermethods have been
devised.
It appears that the two most important
of the new Allied devices are an improved
electric submarine·detector and the maaa
protection of convoys by naval and air
forccs (including blimps and heliocopter8
which are able to move slowly with the
convoys). Salvage vessels also regularly
accompany convoys on the high seas now.
Moreover, stokers on Allied ships have
undergone a special training, and fuel is
carefully selected to avoid the forming of
heavy smoke which gives away the ships'
position.
The protection of the convoys is no longer
undertaken chiefly by destroyers and cor-
vettes but by planes based either on coaatal
airfields or, where this is not possible, on
convoy aircraft carriers, which are converted
cro.isers or merchantmen equipped with a
flying deck. The aircraft carrier sails in the
center of the convoy, llnd its planes observe
the surface of the sea from a great height.
Not only do they report V·boats to the
convoying destroyers: they also a.ttack them
with bombs and machine guns. The fight
against the combined destroyer.airplane pro-
tection of the convoys requires entirely Ilew
tactics and the utmost in training on the
part of the V-boats.
U-BOAT LOSSRS
Allied leaders have recently made very
confident statements on the destruction of
German submarines. Thus, in hiB speech
in the House of Commons early in June
1943, Churchill said that during May the
destruction of V·boats had for the first
time surpassed the number of boats newly
put into service; and the navy correspondent
of the Daily Expre88 reported on June 21
that in May and June 50 V-boats had been
sunk. During the whole war, he claimed,
250 Axis V-boats had been destroyed, which
must amount to about one quarter or one
third of the new production. We recall
that in 1942 the First Lord of the British
Admiralty declared that no less than 500
German V-boats had been sent to the
bottom of the sea. Apparently the Allies
have no idea as to how many V-boats they
really have destroyed.
According to a Rome report of October
22, 1943, Admiral Legnani stated in a radio
broadcast that Italy had lost 84 V-boats
during this war. This would mean that in
36 months of war she lost a monthly average
of 2.33 boats. The GermaD losses during
the Great War amounted to 185 boats lost
in action, while seven were interned in neu-
tral ports. The monthly average was thus
3.63. At the rate of her Great War IORReR,
Germany would have lost in the present
war a total of 180 V-boats up to the end
of October 1943. During the Great War,
the heaviest losses occurred in the mine
bo.rrages laid in the Channel and the North
Sea and by means of decoy ships, which
need not be taken into account in this
war. Consequently, there is no reason why
the German losses should be higher now.
This all the more 80 since the modern V·boat
is much better adapted for its job than
those of the years 1914/18.
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It is only Datura 'that early in ]943 the
U-boats should have suffered some losses
until they were fully aware of tho new
weapons on the Allied side; but Admiral
Donitz is not likely to havo left his U·boats
exposed long enough for them to ButTer
grave losses. From the somewhat abrupt
halt of the great submarine offensive last
spring, one might rather conclude that he
started withdrawing them as soon as it
became clear that the Dew Allied tactics
required new counterdeviees.
According to German reports, far-reaching
decentralization has resulted in submarine
production not having been interfered with
by the Allied 'air bombardments of coastal
towns. Toward the end of November,
Admiral Donit.z and Minister of Armaments
Speer wero reported to have taken part in
trial runs of newly equipped submarines.
Moreover, Admiral Donitz bas predicted
that German science will keep up with the
advance of the Allies and that the German
U-boll.ts will reappear on the high seas wit,h
new fighting methods and new weapons
more devastating than ever before.
The Allies do not seem to doubt th.is.
Early in September, Colonel Knox, US
Secretary of the Navy, decln.red: "We have
by no means disposed of the aubmarine
menace, and attacks will be made on Allied
merchantmen 8B sure 118 the SUD will rise,"
On October 4, the Washington Post gave
some details on a. new magnetio torpedo
used by German V-boats. On October 9,
the US Office of War Information released
a joint statement by President Roosevelt
and Prime Minister Churchill pointing to the
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Table II nl.'cJ~ Rome explanatory remarks.
Hitherto our figures for tonnage undcr
repair, for 10. cs through mines, and for
IORse.s through ordinary hazards, have beon
basod on our estimate made at the end of
July 1942 (soo August/September 1942 i sue).
I ixtcen months having passed since then, n.
rovi ion of those figures has appeared neC{'1-j-
sary to us, and we ha.ve increased thern by
500,000, 500,000 and 200,000 tons reilrec-
tively.
Ali t.o t he tonnage permanently unrler
repair, our figw'e of 2,500,000 tons seems u.
very conservative one. According to 0.
report from Stockholm dated August 18,
1943, this figure includes only repairs duo to
(ierman submarine action (i.e., not those
due to German Luftwaffe aotion or to action
by the Jupane e and Italian forces) und
vcssels tied up in British dockyards (i.e.,
cxcluding USA dockyards and those in other
parts of the world open to the AUies). Nor
docs this figure include the ordina.ry repain
wh-ich every ship has to undergo from time
to time. Much IUgher figures have fre-
quently beon mentioned by Anglo-American
omcial sources and commentators during
the last year. During the last six months
in partieuJar, the total of slUps damaged by
military aotion was extremely high, owing
to tbe various landing operations on the
part of the Anglo-American force8. Ao.
cording to the German High Command, the
number of 8hips and the aggregate tonnage
heav'ily damaged by the German armed
forces were as follows:
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While the German High Command reg-
ularly issues figuros of sinkings Cor each
month, Japan and ltaly ha.ve published
their figures at irregular intervals and in-
completely. But this docs Dot mean that
Japau /11:1.1:1 heel! idlo since August 1943.
Accoruing to official announcements collected
b~- tlR, 74 tra.nsports were sunk during this
tillle. No tonnage figures were announced,
but 1110. t of the tran ports were designated
a having boon larg. Hence about one
million tons may have to be add d to the
grand total culculat,cd above.
To th('sc act,ual inkings must be added
further tonnage reductions in the Allied
In vi('w of tht" fa t that thiR ~tatement
wad i"ljlle-L! shortlr before the Mo cow Con-
fcrence, t he ala['~l cxpres ed in it was per-
ha.p. om what exnggrrated in order to
imrrc tho Sovi ts. Indeed, wo are in-
(·linCli to believe that it will be BOrne time
IJPfore the submariJl are again fully at
work. J t takes time to refit aU the vessels
and to ~ive the crews the required new
training before the boats may be sent out
a~ain. Tho isolated but successful a.ttacks
rt'(;cntly announced by the German High
('ollllll!tnd nre, ther fore, to our mind not
yC'l tiJ tart of a new otTellBive but rather
~.n indication of tritd Itction.
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ML'I ES AN 1) OTLI ER HAZARDS
TABL~ 111
Allied Ships Damalled by the German Armed
Forces in 1943
hips damaged but not obRerved by the
German forces, a well a hips damaged by
min and by the Japane e and Italian
forces, should be added to the above figures.
Mor 'over, many of the heavily damaged
shipR may never have reached port. The
t.otal Allied tonnage damaged by the Axis
during the first eleven months of 19-1:3 is
cstilUltted by BerLin at. over [; million tonli.
A comparison with Great War figures
seem wo to justify our figure of 2,500,000
ton. In his book The C,.sia of the Nat'at
lVar, Admiral Jellicoe says that the number
of vessels which completed repairs during
August. 1917 was 3 2, with a tonnage of
1, I 3,000 tons, and that in November it
was !J.42, with a tonnage of 1,509,000 tons.
In additi n to this ther were 326 ship in
Augu t and 350 in November awaiting re-
pairs. The Admiral c timated the total of
ships under repair every year to have been
betw n 3,600 and 4,000.
During the 51 months of the Great War
th German Admiralty estimated the losses
inflicted on enemy shipping and ships in
enemy service through mill warfare to have
boon 3,700,000 tons. After the war it was
asoert.ained that this estimate was too high.
Hence our figure of 2,500,000 tons for 50
months of warflU'e, i.e., an average of 50,000
tons a month, representing about 65 per
'ent of the losses estimated by the German
Admir[dty for the Great War, would appear
to be w U within reasoll. As a matter of
fact, a German rommentator, Admiral
Brueninghaus, quoted in The Shanghai 'l',:m.es
of June 14, has estimated the AUied losses
from mines at more thl\n :3 million tons.
Our timate 'of 2 million tons of shipping
10 t through ord.ina.ry hazards and deprecia-
tion IiI,; wise seem cons>rvlIolive. It amounts
to I.GZ5 per cent per annum of the 39
million tons (ships of ov r 1,000 tons) the
AlliC.'J started with in 1939, and 2.375 per
cent per annum of the average tonnage
Slink I Dllma."od Runk Damagoo
byJapanesoforccl b~· Gernu," forC'o...
BaLLI IlIp:! U .j 0 :.l
Cruisonl 3U 13 U 35
Aircraft
Carrierll 11 (} 0 0
Do:!lroveril :.lU II ,j[i 411
MOlor ;1'or,
pedououlll 0 0 41 33
Submarancs :!2 0 [, 4
available to the Allies during the four years
of war. Although vessels Me kept in serv-
ice longer during war time, ord.i.nary hazards
are increased by the fact that ships must
travel at night without navigation lights,
must avoid tho use of wire168ll, etc.
REPLACEMENTS
We do not intend to take our readen over
the long, tortuous road we have aga.in
traversed in our endeavor to appraise the
actual Allied replacements of torlJlage..~:me
of t.he most controversial topics in the pres-
ent war. On the basis of all information
available, including data published in neutral
European newRpapers of recent date--neu-
tral, with a good dose of Anglo-American
sympathies-we have, since our last survey
of t.he Battle of Tons, raised our estimate
of monthly Allied replacements from 600,000
tons to 1,100,000 tons as from June 194-3.
Thus we assumo that replacements by new
constructiollB in aU Allied countries up to
the end of November 1943 amount to
18,700,000 gross registered tOIlB (correspond-
ing to about 27,000,000 dead.weight tons).
Although our analysis is concerned only
with mer hant t.onnage. there is one factor
that must not be overlooked here. Ex-
ceptiouaUy high naval loStle8 necessarily
reflect unfavorably on the building of mer-
chantmen; for, in order to overcome a
~Iangerous short.age of men.of-war, priority
IS sure to be gi,'en to the building of these
latter in the way of material, skilled labor,
equipment, etc.
TABLE IV
Allied Naval Losses from June 5 to
necember 3, 1943
(a.ccording to oni"il'( Japau08e Ilnt! <Jarmlll) figuroal
Thesc xtr 'mcly high Allioo losses due
chiefly to their large-scale landing operations
in the Pacific and the Mediterranean caunot
but interfere with the replacement program
of merchant Lonnage.
Ton.
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THE MEDlTERRA~EAN
ince our 18 't analy is of th shipping
ituation, great change have takl'n place in
th Meditcrranl'an. Th Rou: of 8VOY
and it ne 'ompli CIl handeu over the Italian
Nln-y and merchant marine--as far as the
ship' w.'r not ized or unk bv German
force -to the Anglo-Americans, But more
importnllt than the Allies' gain in tonna.ge
is the fact that, owing t,o their stronger
po it ion in the Mediterranean, the Anglo.
American, can now largely di. pense with
the detour around Afriea. which hampered
t1lt'ir e/TortI.! when Rommel" army stood in
Libya and Eg)'pt. There can be no doubt
that he Anglo·Americans have derived
gront advantages from these changes. On
the other hand, the Allied hope that the
Mediterranean would now be proof against
ubmllJ'ine attacks has been dispelled by the
German High Command's announcements on
o tober fi that German ubmarines in the
Mediterranean sank seven ships, totaling
09,000 toilS and one destroyer, out of 0.
convoy n lIJ' the orth AIrican coast; on
o tober 21, another 'ven ships totaling
54,000 tons; and on November 6, thirteen
transports totaling 140,000 ton .
Undaunted by Badoglio's treason, G r·
many has been forming a small, efficient
navy in tho Mediterranean whi h includes
German V·boats and fast motor torpedoboats
as well as all the Italian corvettes, destroyers,
-boats, and motor torpedoboats which
voluntarily joined the German forces or were
captured by them. In addition to this, the
German Navy hn taken over all the French
naval units (ying in Toulon and pllJ'tly sunk
in November 1942. The major part of the
lighter ve Is are back in service, while the
I· rench battleships Dunkerque and SfTMbouTfI.
no few heavy cruisers, and an aircraft carrier,
all well n.s the Italian battl('ship~ Cavour and
],1I/JeTO nnd om modCJ'n Italian cruisers,
wiJJ soon be ready for action.
As.ido from the fact that the Luftwaffe
can strike with gr at efT ctiveness at hip
concentrations in Itali8l1 waters, the advan·
tages of the shorter pas age through the
Mediterranean are probably IllJ'gely offset by
the need of supplying tbe great number of
forces now landed in that area. It has
becn claimed that the opening of the Medi.
terranean route equals a gain of about 2
million ton of shipping. On the other hand,
from a. report emanating from RAF Heau.
quarters and dated May 31, 1943, we learn
tha t, the pro,-isioning of one soldier r q II ires
no less than 18 gros regi tered ton a year.
If thili figure i correct, it means thut the
n w df'Dland. made on .hipping "y th
landing- ill sont hC'rn Europe con"idl'rn hly
surras::! t,ll' tonnage aved O\\ing to tbe
opl'ning of the MediterralPan.
THE DALANCJo;
Adding our estimate of I ,700 ()()() tons of
replacements to the 39 million ton, of Allied
shipping in 1939, we reach a grand total of
57,700,000 ton::! at the Alii,s' diHpoHal up
to t"o"eru bel' 30, I!l-t:l. ~uut raet jug from
this the sinkillgs and other shipping losses
sustuined uy the Allies since ~ept{mlbcr :3,
1939, which we have estimated at 42,tlOO,17S
tons, we arrive at a balance of about 15
miJlion tons in favor of the Allies on Novem·
ber 30, 1943, counting only ship with a
t.onnuge of over 1,000 tons. (The way in
whi h we arrived nt the flf,'1lre of : 9 million
gross registered tons of ships of OV('I' 1,000
ton. in Allied Hen'ic ineiliding the U~:\
but excluding Sovict Russin-i explained
in our issue of Aligu tf 'eptcmber 1942.)
This figure il! to the best of our knowledge
as close to reality as it is po ibl to get
with the information here. On th whole.
it tallies with serious Allied estimllt '".
In our ,last report on the Battle of Tons
we spoke of the "Ilci ors" of sinking and
replaeementll in Allied shipping. Since Jnne
1943 the Allics have been able to close the
"scissors" nnd, for the time bl'ing. ('\'1'11 to
rev rse the former trend. Their t.otnl avail-
able tonnage has risen from an all·time-low
of about 12million tons to somel5milliol1 tons.
But the Battle of TOll is a constant truggle
between production and destrllction, between
Axis offensive and Allied defensivl'. (Tp~
and downs are part of this trugglr'; and
whiJe Germony hnd the uPI r hand for 43
mont.hs. th Allies h "e bad the ad\'antage
for eight months.
In pito of the help given them by French
and Italian traitors, the Allied forces have
made low progress in their North African
and Italian campaigns. They have, till not
e tabli hed a real "sccond front' uut. ar
instead tryinJ( to destroy Germany from the
air. All this shows that the almost 34 miWon
Allied tons link by Axis force repre nt 0
heavy a blow that a reprieve of u few months
ha b en not able fundamentally to nlt.cr the
shipping situation.
